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A B S T R A C T
This systematic review attempts to understand how people keep secrets online, and in particular how people use
the internet when engaging in covert behaviours and activities regarding the procurement and supply of illicit
drugs. With the Internet and social media being part of everyday life for most people in western and non-western
countries, there are ever-growing opportunities for individuals to engage in covert behaviours and activities
online that may be considered illegal or unethical. A search strategy using Medical Subject Headings terms and
relevant key words was developed. A comprehensive literature search of published and unpublished studies in
electronic databases was conducted. Additional studies were identified from reference lists of previous studies
and (systematic) reviews that had similar objectives as this search, and were included if they fulfilled our in-
clusion criteria. Two researchers independently screened abstracts and full-texts for study eligibility and eval-
uated the quality of included studies. Disagreements were resolved by a consensus procedure. The systematic
review includes 33 qualitative studies and one cross-sectional study, published between 2006 and 2018. Five
covert behaviours were identified: the use of communication channels; anonymity; visibility reduction; limited
posts in public; following forum rules and recommendations. The same technologies that provide individuals
with easy access to information, such as social networking sites and forums, digital devices, digital tools and
services, also increase the prevalence of inaccurate information, loss of privacy, identity theft and disinhibited
communication. This review takes a rigorous interdisciplinary approach to synthesising knowledge on the
strategies adopted by people in keeping secrets online. Whilst the focus is on the procurement and supply of
illicit drugs, this knowledge is transferrable to a range of contexts where people keep secrets online. It has
particular significance for those who design online/social media applications, and for law enforcement and
security agencies.
Introduction
This paper reports on an interdisciplinary systematic review con-
ducted to uncover the covert strategies deployed by individuals en-
gaged in illicit drug procurement and/or supply through online drug
marketplaces and social media, and the enablers and barriers en-
countered in using these strategies. The research was carried out as part
of the Keeping Secrets Online project (crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/
keeping-secrets-online/), which synthesises new knowledge of how
people use the Internet to facilitate secret-keeping in a range of con-
texts.
The topic of illicit drug procurement and supply was selected as a
rich area of study as there is a high level of motivation for people to
keep secrets in this context, due to the potential for punishment by the
authorities and censure by family, colleagues and friends if caught.
Drug offences are both severely punishable and highly stigmatised in
the United Kingdom. For instance, possession of cannabis carries a
sentence of up to five years in prison plus an unlimited fine, while its
supply is punishable with up to 14 years in prison plus an unlimited fine
(Askew & Salinas, 2019). Users and suppliers can be stigmatised or
discriminated against irrespective of whether they have received a
criminal record for their use. Thus sanctions for drug offences, which
result in labelling and stigmatisation, can have long-term collateral
consequences – e.g. convicted drug users/dealers may be subject to
disapproval from their partners, friends or family, it may be more dif-
ficult for them to get a job, landlords may be reluctant to give them
tenancies, and communities may resist the establishment of treatment
centres where they can seek help (Askew & Salinas, 2019;
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Jones, Simonson, & Singleton, 2010).
The effects of certain drugs are considered to be sufficiently dan-
gerous or harmful that their (nonmedical) use has been prohibited in-
ternationally. These drugs affect the Central Nervous System – either
stimulating (e.g. (crack) cocaine or amphetamines or ecstasy) or in-
hibiting it (e.g. opiates, heroin or sedative-hypnotics such as benzo-
diazepines or barbiturates), – or cause hallucinogenic effects (such as
marijuana or hashish, LSD, and phenocyclidine) (Houck & Siegel, 2015;
Uutela, 2001). The secrets that need to be kept around their purchase
and supply include who is involved, what is being traded, organisation
of the delivery of drugs to physical locations, and financial transactions
involved in buying and selling the drugs.
The Internet – and more broadly, digital technologies, devices and
services – create considerable potential for online drug supply. The
European Drug Report 2016 highlights the rapid rate of change in this
area, driven by “increasing use of the internet, the deployment of new
payment technologies, innovations in encryption and new options for
the creation of distributed online marketplaces” (EMCDDA, 2016, p.
15). The challenges presented by these drivers “represent questions of
critical importance for the future European policy agenda”
(EMCDDA, 2016, p. 15). Here, we expand on each of these drivers – use
of the internet, payment technologies, encryption and distributed on-
line marketplaces – in turn, before considering opportunities for de-
tecting illegal activity, and the overarching objectives of the systematic
review undertaken.
Use of the Internet
Increasing use of the Internet for purchase and supply of drugs is
seen both in terms of information and communications across multiple
channels. i. Surface Web, Deep Web and Dark Web
Material contained within the Internet extends far beyond what is
returned via standard search engines such as Google. Much is buried far
down on dynamically generated sites, and standard search engines
never find it (Bergman, 2001). The Internet can be understood as
comprising of three elements: the Surface Web, Deep Web and Dark
Web.
The Surface Web constitutes the part of the Web gathered and in-
dexed by conventional general-purpose search engines such as Google,
Firefox, Bing, etc. However, such search engines are capable of indexing
just a small portion of available Web information (Beshiri &
Susuri, 2019; EMCDDA & Europol, 2017; Iliou, Kalpakis, Tsikrika,
Vrochidis, & Kompatsiaris, 2016).
Another part of the Internet is the Deep Web which comprises con-
tent that cannot be detected by the crawlers employed by conventional
search engines, and includes information on the private networks and
intranets that are password-protected behind logins, encrypted, or
disallowed by the owner. By definition, private social media profiles on
Facebook or Twitter are considered part of the Deep Web, too (Beshiri &
Susuri, 2019; Iliou et al., 2016; Schäfer et al., 2019).
There is also a part of the Deep Web, known as the Dark Web, that
provides anonymity both from a user and a data perspective, as its
content is intentionally hidden and cannot be accessed by standard web
browsers, but instead requires the use of special software. For this
reason, the Dark Web has become popular for material such as “child
pornography, unauthorised leaks of sensitive information, money
laundering, copyright infringement, credit card fraud, identity theft,
illegal sales of weapons and disseminating extremist content”
(Weimann, 2016) The Dark Web is formed by several darknets such as
The Onion Router (TOR) – which enables online anonymous commu-
nication – and the Invisible Internet Project (I2P), which is used for
anonymous communication, users’ traffic encryption, etc. (Beshiri &
Susuri, 2019; EMCDDA & Europol, 2017; Iliou et al., 2016;
Schäfer et al., 2019). The anonymity afforded by the Dark Web enables
those engaged in the purchase and supply of drugs to conceal their
identities. ii. Online communication via social media
The term “social media” serves as a blanket term for describing “a
group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and
technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and
exchange of User Generated Content” (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). So-
cial media – notably social networking sites (SNS), forums and en-
crypted messaging services – act as central communication channels in
the online supply and purchase of drugs.
In general terms, social media is an important part of internet use. It
supports keeping in touch with friends and family, sharing photos and
videos, staying up to date with news and current affairs – and main-
taining communities of shared interest, whatever that interest may be.
In the UK, 2018 data from OfCom shows extensive uptake of social
media across society via the Surface Web – e.g. Facebook (88%),
WhatsApp (61%), Instagram (38%), YouTube (35%), SnapChat and
Twitter (25%) (OFcom, 2019). It is predictable that social media should
be exploited for illegal activities. Indeed, social media – specifically
social networking sites (SNS) – lend themselves to such activities, as
“web-based services that allow individuals to construct a public or
semi-public profile within a bounded system; articulate a list of other
users with whom they share a connection; and view and traverse their
list of connections and those made by others within the system” (Boyd
& Ellison, 2007). Beneath the Surface Web, the Dark Web Social Net-
work (DWSN) now offers a social networking site that is only accessible
to Web browsers equipped with TOR, making it well-suited to the fa-
cilitation of drug purchase and supply as it provides assured anonymity
(Gehl, 2016).
More broadly, online forums are the most common services ap-
pearing on the Dark Web. They serve as a disnormative space that
enables illegal activities, within which drug dealers and users can ar-
ticulate information needs and views around usage, availability and
price of drugs (Haasio, Harviainen, & Savolainen, 2019). A further form
of social media, encrypted messaging services, hold a key position within
online drug markets. Increasingly, these services appear to be harnessed
by vendors of illegal substances due to the lack of specialist knowledge
required in their use, and provision of some security features that are
expected to protect vendors from police detection and prosecution
(Moyle, Childs, Coomber, & Barratt, 2019). Apps such as Kik, Wickr and
WhatsApp that provide encrypted messaging services have become so
central to drug supply that they present the “new way of online
dealing”. However, we emphasise that favoured forms of social media
are subject to change, as online technologies evolve and new oppor-
tunities for unobserved communication surface.
Distributed online marketplaces: cryptomarkets
Drug markets have changed radically, with the internet increasingly
used for the sale of drugs. As access to technology and the Internet has
expanded noticeably, recent years have seen a dramatic growth in the
sale of a variety of illicit substances via ‘cryptomarkets’ – hidden online
marketplaces – with online sales projected to increase exponentially
(Holt, 2017; Miller & Sønderlund, 2010; Mounteney, Oteo, & Griffiths,
2016). According to Martin (2014), cryptomarkets are anonymous on-
line forums “where goods and services are exchanged between parties who
use digital encryption to conceal their identities” (p. 356).
Cryptomarkets, and the cryptocurrencies – digital or virtual cur-
rencies that use cryptography for security – used to transact purchases
on them, are central to the procurement and supply of illegal drugs, and
intrinsically facilitate covert behaviour by buyer and seller (Aldridge &
Décary-Hétu, 2016). An additional advantage of cryptomarkets is their
association with substantially less threats and violence than conven-
tional drug distribution channels such as friendships, dealers and open
markets (Barratt, Ferris, & Winstock, 2016).
There are two essential elements that have given birth to crypto-
markets: anonymity networks and the use of anonymous financial
transactions. Anonymity networks enable anonymous and untraceable
access to the Internet. The Onion Router (TOR), is the most widely
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adopted of these technologies (Gad, 2014). TOR was released in 2002.
It is used to conceal a user's location or usage from anyone conducting
network surveillance or traffic analysis by directing Internet traffic
through a free, worldwide, volunteer network consisting of more than
five thousand relays (Buxton & Bingham, 2015). Using TOR makes it
more difficult for Internet activity to be traced back to the user, in-
cluding their visits to websites, online posts, messages, and other
communication forms (Gad, 2014). Further, to ensure their own
privacy, users may encrypt their communications. The most common
message encryption program is PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), used by
cryptomarket administrators, vendors and buyers. PGP allows the user
to encrypt text and files so that only the intended recipient is able to
decrypt it (Mounteney et al., 2016).
The combination of covert communications and covert payments
facilitated by TOR and message encryption programs has led to the
proliferation of hidden web marketplaces. The most well-known cryp-
tomarket was the “Silk Road” created in 2001, by Ross Ulbricht, who
operated under the pseudonym of the Dread Pirate Roberts (Aldridge &
Décary-Hétu, 2015). Silk Road was accessible only to people using TOR.
Its main characteristics were the combination of technologies used to
hide internet user activities and technologies that allowed individuals
to make purchases with a digital, non-identity-carrying form of cash.
Since its shutdown by the FBI in 2013, numerous other cryptomarkets
have taken its place (Barratt & Aldridge, 2016; Foley, Karlsen, &
Putniņš, 2019), and are used by cryptomarket traders.
Payment technologies: cryptocurrencies
Within cryptomarkets, traders use cryptocurrencies (Barratt, 2012)
which enable anonymous financial transactions to both buyers and
sellers. Cryptocurrencies are lines of computer code that hold monetary
value, and are among the largest unregulated markets in the world
(Gad, 2014; Maheshram & Singhai, 2018).
The first cryptocurrency (Bitcoin) was established in 2009
(Maurer, Nelms, & Swartz, 2013; Phelps & Watt, 2014). Bitcoin is a
decentralised, peer-to-peer payment network that is powered by its
users with no central authority or middle-men, using computational
proof of the chronological order of transactions. The transactions are
bundled together into a block which includes a cryptographic puzzle.
The mathematics of the puzzle ensures that although it is difficult to
solve, it is easy to verify. The system is secure and counterfeit-free as
long as honest nodes control a majority of CPU power and thus it will
become computationally impractical for an attacker to change the
transactions (EMCDDA & Europol, 2017; Maurer et al., 2013;
Nakamoto, 2008). It is an international currency, not associated with
any country or central bank, backed only by its limited total supply and
the willingness of Bitcoin users to recognise its value and trust its
cryptographic algorithm (Maurer et al., 2013). The source code of
Bitcoin was made freely available and therefore anyone can create a
currency either identical to, or based on, the Bitcoin model. In the
period between 2009 and 2014, many other cryptocurrencies have been
established, such as Litecoin, Namecoin, Peercoin, Ripple, Dogecoin,
Mastercoin, Primecoin, Auroracoin, Vertcoin, MazaCoin, Coinye.
However, there is limited information available about illegal activities
involving Bitcoin, as well as the number of cryptocurrencies of all types
that exist (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2015; Foley et al., 2019;
Maheshram & Singhai, 2018; Phelps & Watt, 2014; UNODC, 2014). It is
known that the total market capitalisation of Bitcoin alone exceeds
$250 billion as at January 2018, with a further $400 billion distributed
across over 1,000 other cryptocurrencies (Foley et al., 2019).
Detecting illegal activity
Cryptocurrencies seem to be effective not only in facilitating illegal
trade, but also in the detection of illegal activity despite the currency's
anonymity, due to the public nature of the blockchain. For instance,
monitoring transactions transmitted from computers to the blockchain
enables individual transactions to be linked to the IP (Internet Protocol)
address of the sender (Christin, 2013). Supporters of the anonymity
provided by cryptocurrencies are developing new currencies that
challenge such detection methods. These new currencies include
Monero and ZCash, which both hide the user's identity (Foley et al.,
2019).
In response to anonymity networks and the use of anonymous fi-
nancial transactions, law enforcement agencies use a number of stra-
tegies to detect illegal activity on the hidden web, ranging from cyber-
surveillance to forensic analysis. Such strategies include online detec-
tion by infiltrating the TOR network to determine individual IP ad-
dresses, and decoding the financial infrastructure of Bitcoin to identify
individuals; postal detection and interception strategies by monitoring
suspicious packages passing through the postal service, and ordering
drugs on crypto markets to investigate the return address on the
package; and online disruption by conducting major seizures
(Christin, 2013; Foley et al., 2019; Kruithof et al., 2016).
There is a growing literature on the online illicit drug trade itself,
yet limited empirical evidence exists concerning the related covert
behaviours necessary to engage in this trade. This review therefore
sought to understand what strategies people use to engage in covert
illicit activities online, and how online technologies facilitate or ob-
struct illicit drug procurement and/or supply through online drug
marketplaces and social media.
Objectives of the systematic review
The purpose of this systematic review was to (i) identify how people
keep secrets online and what acts as enablers and barriers in the context
of procurement/supply of illicit drugs, and (ii) identify how these
strategies, enablers and barriers vary based on age, gender and culture.
More specifically, the following research questions were addressed.
Research Question 1 (RQ1)
Strategies, enablers and barriers for keeping secrets online re-
garding procurement/supply of illicit drugs:
a) What strategies do people use to keep secrets online from family,
friends and members of their wider social networks?
b) What enables effective implementation of the strategies identified in
RQ1a?
c) What are the barriers to effective implementation of the strategies
identified in RQ1a?
Research Question 2 (RQ2)
Effect of demographic variables on RQ1:
a) How are the strategies identified in RQ1 affected by age?
b) How are the strategies identified in RQ1 affected by gender?
c) How do strategies identified in RQ1 vary across non-western and
diaspora populations?
Method
A systematic review of covert strategies, enablers and barriers re-
garding procurement/supply of illegal drugs was conducted. The pro-
tocol was registered in the International Prospective Register of
Systematic Reviews (with Registration number CRD42018091687).
Inclusion criteria
Studies were included in the review if they met the following cri-
teria:
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Types of studies
Any quantitative or qualitative research study, which presented
empirical methods and results, was considered for this review.
Types of participants
Any study conducted in western and non-western countries, with
participants who engage in illegal drug procurement or supply, was
included in this review. Studies focused on adolescents were excluded.
No restrictions were placed on gender, geographical region, education
level or sexuality.
Phenomenon of interest
The review includes studies which explored Internet use by in-
dividuals who are engaged in covert activities related to illegal drugs,
and, more specifically, their procurement or supply.
Types of outcomes
The review was not restricted based on the kind of outcome studied,
as the nature of the outcome measured was itself an item of interest. In
particular, we were interested in covert behaviour strategies (i.e. fi-
nancial transactions, network memberships, online drug forums, co-
dewords), enablers and barriers. The secondary outcomes of our in-
terest were the health effects from illegal drug use, as well as the effects
of covert behaviour on physical and mental health (i.e. stress, quality of
life).
Language
Only studies written in English language were included.
Date of publication
2004 – to current (searches conducted February 2018). The date
was chosen considering the up-to-date technologies and the release year
of networks of our interest. For example, Facebook was released on
2004, Myspace had been released one year earlier, while TOR had been
released only 2 years earlier. Other social networking sites, such as
Twitter, were released in later years.
Search strategy
A search strategy, using Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) terms
and relevant key words was developed (Appendix Tables A and B). The
MeSH is a controlled vocabulary for describing various topics which has
been shown to greatly facilitate document retrieval. Many synonyms,
near-synonyms, and closely related concepts are included as entry
terms to help users find the most relevant MeSH descriptor for the
concept they are seeking (Huang, Neveol, & Lu, 2011). The search
strategies followed structured guidelines and standards used in social
and health sciences (Higgins et al., 2011; Popay et al., 2006). This
process facilitated a more evidence-based approach to literature
searching, helped to rapidly and accurately locate the best available
scientific information and avoided unnecessary searching. The search
strategies included combining terms related to illicit drug use with
terms related to internet use with Boolean operators. Searches were
restricted to include studies published from 2004 until the date of the
search (February 2018) and written in English language. No restrictions
were placed on the search in terms of place of publication.
The following databases were searched: Medline (via Ovid), HMIC
(via Ovid), ASSIA (via ProQuest), PsycInfo (Ebsco) and ACM Digital
Library. In addition, Google Scholar was searched with the results being
capped at the first 100 records (sorted by relevance). Grey literature
was sought by manually searching the following websites relevant to
the topic area: the CrimDoc (Criminology Library Grey Literature), the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the National Crime Agency,
RAND Co-operation, Interpol, and the PEW Research Centre. Editorials,
letters, working papers, reports and reviews were excluded. Finally, in
order to ensure no relevant studies were omitted, additional studies
were identified from the reference lists of studies which met the in-
clusion criteria and were included in the review.
Study selection process
The screening process of abstracts and titles of all records identified
by the search was conducted by two reviewers (AGr, AGa). The ab-
stracts were included if they met the inclusion criteria or insufficient
information was available in the abstract to determine eligibility. Any
disagreements were resolved by AGr and AGa. The full text for any
study that potentially met the inclusion was retrieved and in-
dependently screened by both AGr and AGa using a predesigned criteria
form (Appendix Table C). Differences in judgment were resolved
through a consensus procedure. A record was kept of all discarded full-
text articles, including the reason for discard.
Quality assessment
Two review authors (AGr, AGa) independently evaluated the
methodological quality of each study using an assessment tool appro-
priate to the study design. Discrepancies were resolved through a
consensus procedure. Due to the methodological diversity of the in-
cluded research studies, different assessment tools were used on a case
by case basis. The Critical Appraisal Skills Program (CASP) Checklist for
qualitative studies and the Appraisal tool for Cross-Sectional Studies
(AXIS tool) were chosen.
The Critical Appraisal Skills Program (CASP) Checklist is an ap-
praisal tool for qualitative studies which comprises 10 questions. The
questions address three broad issues: (1) Are the results of the study
valid? (2) What are the results? (3) Will the results help locally (how
valuable is the research)? The CASP tool has areas to record a “yes”,
“no” or “can't tell” answer for each question (Dixon-Woods et al., 2007;
Walsh & Downe, 2006).
The following appraisal tool was developed for use in appraising
observational cross-sectional studies. The Appraisal tool for Cross-
Sectional Studies (AXIS tool) consists of 20 components. Seven (1, 4,
10, 11, 12, 16 and 18) of the questions related to quality of reporting,
seven (2, 3, 5, 8, 17, 19 and 20) of the questions related to study design
quality and six related to the possible introduction of biases in the study
(6, 7, 9, 13, 14 and 15). The AXIS tool has areas to record a “yes”, “no”
or “don't know” answer for each question and there is room for short
comments as well. It has the benefit of providing the user the oppor-
tunity to assess each individual aspect of study design to give an overall
assessment of the quality of the study. By providing this subjectivity,
AXIS gives the user more flexibility in incorporating quality of reporting
and risk of bias when making judgments on the quality of a paper
(Downes, Brennan, Williams, & Dean, 2016).
Data extraction
A data extraction form was developed, reviewed and refined by the
researchers to better capture the key aspects that are essential for
evaluation, synthesis and presentation, ensuring the adequacy of the
tool. The data extraction form includes information on publication
(title, authors, year), aim of the study, country, context and setting,
sampling approach, ethical issues, participant characteristics (e.g.
number, age, gender), data collection methods (e.g. interview, focus
group, questionnaire, lurking, web crawling), data analysis approach,
data collected (e.g. number of interviews, number, number of forum
posts), key themes. One reviewer extracted the data (AGr), while a
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second reviewer (AGa) checked all the extracted data.
Evidence synthesis
A narrative synthesis of the findings from the included studies and
the structures around the type of studies (experimental, survey, eth-
nography etc.) was provided. This approach is flexible, allowing for
different types of evidence, qualitative and quantitative, to be reviewed
(Mays, Pope, & Popay, 2005; Popay et al., 2006).
Content analysis was used to identify different clusters/groupings of
strategies for secret keeping, the frequency with which these strategies
are employed and the extent to which they are effective in maintaining
privacy. Content analysis is a systematic, replicable technique for
compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on
explicit rules of coding (Stemler, 2001). It is also useful for examining
trends and patterns in documents (Mays et al., 2005; Popay et al.,
2006). The process of creating codes was a combination of both pre-
determined (a priori) and emergent coding. Predetermined coding was
based on a previous coding dictionary from other relevant research
studies and key concepts, while emergent coding was based on con-
cepts, actions, or meanings that evolved from the data and were dif-
ferent from the predetermined codes (Stemler, 2001).
Thematic analysis of the data, the most common method adopted
within narrative reviews, was used to systematically identify the main,
recurrent or most important themes or concepts across the included
studies (Popay et al., 2006). Thematic analysis provides a means of
organising and summarising the findings from large, diverse bodies of
research (Mays et al., 2005; Popay et al., 2006). In order to identify the
barriers and enablers which influence why a strategy may succeed or
fail, the following three stages were conducted: coding text, developing
descriptive themes, generating analytical themes (Thomas &
Harden, 2008).
In addition, the qualitative software NVivo (12.0) was utilised to
facilitate the conduct of the analysis. Using NVivo provides a robust and
pragmatic way to manage the complexities of conducting qualitative
evidence synthesis, facilitates framework synthesis and provides a clear
audit trail, enhancing confidence in the synthesis findings
(Houghton et al., 2017).
A process of translation of studies was used to explore the re-
lationship between strategies used and the demographics. The robust-
ness of the synthesis was also assessed by considering the quality of the
evidence related to the research findings, for drawing conclusions about
the strategies, facilitators and/or barriers identified in the synthesis. A
summary discussion section was provided including the following:
methodology of the synthesis used, evidence used, assumptions made,
discrepancies and uncertainties identified (Popay et al., 2006).
Results
We first provide an overview of the studies returned by our sys-
tematic review. We then provide details of the covert strategies and
associated facilitators and barriers identified within these studies, and
assess the quality of the included studies.
Literature searches
Our primary search in the predefined databases resulted in 1198
hits. A further 225 hits were found in other sources, giving a total of
1423 citations (see Fig. 1). The latter included references from relevant
studies and reviews, publications from the CrimDoc: Criminal Justice
Grey Literature Database and Google scholar. After duplicates were
removed (n=70), a total of 1353 citations were screened against the
inclusion criteria. Of these, 1273 citations were excluded on the basis of
title, keywords, and abstract. The full texts of the remaining articles
(n=80) were then assessed against the inclusion criteria, resulting in 34
articles being retained. The reasons for exclusion are presented in
Fig. 1.
Description and characteristics of included studies
Thirty-four studies were identified that focused on procurement/
supply of illegal drugs, published between 2006 and 2018. Thirty-three
were qualitative studies and one was a cross-sectional study. Data
sources were mainly obtained from vendor listings, threads, forum
posts, tweets and encrypted online interviews. The studies were con-
ducted in the following countries: USA (n=1), Australia (n=4), Canada
(n=1), Ireland (n=3), Germany (n=1), Finland (n=1), Switzerland
(n=1), Multi-country (n=9), N/A (n=13). An overall description of
the included studies and details of the study designs are presented in
Supplementary Table 1.
Each of the studies included a diverse range of strategies, facilitators
and/or barriers. Five covert strategies related to illegal drug trade were
identified (see Table 2a): (1) use of communication channels; (2)
anonymity, such as anonymous web browsing; (3) visibility reduction;
(4) limited posts in public; (5) following forum rules and re-
commendations. The same digital tools and services that provide in-
dividuals with easy access to information and enable illegal drug trade-
related behaviours, were also used to deter these behaviours (see
Tables 3a and 4a).
A summary of strategies, facilitators and barriers is provided below.
Supplementary Table 2b presents fuller descriptions of the strategies of
the included studies. Supplementary Tables 3b and 4b present fuller
description of the facilitators and barriers of the included studies.
Covert strategies
Use of communication channels
Eight studies reported digital use of communication channels as a
covert strategy related to procurement/supply of illegal drugs.
Members of the Deep Web drug forums leverage censorship-resistant
communication tools like TOR (The Onion Router) to access an en-
crypted Internet environment where their ideas can be exchanged freely
and their need for illicit drugs can be met securely (Backman, 2013).
For example, cryptomarket forums, such as Merkat, have become
meeting points where different kinds of knowledge can be combined
and validated. They develop a risk infrastructure that provides tech-
nical tools, shared knowledge, and shareable judgements to manage
risk (Bancroft, 2017). Moreover, the deep web Reddit website serves as
a social space, where multiple different sub-contexts operate together
and form a grand context for information transfer among people
(Costello, Martin, & Edwards Brinegar, 2017). In addition, when con-
sidering Internet use (a web site, electronic chat room, or e-mail) to
obtain drugs or reach a drug dealer, (Gordon, Forman, & Siatkowski,
2006). Barratt (2011) indicated that almost one third of participants
used private online communication modes to discuss drugs. These pri-
vate modes included instant messaging, private messaging and non-
public-access forums. Twitter also represents a viable modality for
criminal actors to engage in the illegal marketing and sale of pre-
scription-controlled substances online (Mackey & Kalyanam, 2017;
Mackey, Kalyanam, Katsuki, & Lanckriet, 2017). Lavorgna (2015)
highlighted the role of the Internet as an enhanced communication tool
among actors involved in illegal businesses, allowing newcomers to
interject themselves in the trafficking chain as local or even interna-
tional retailers. Communication generally occurs, for instance, via
email spam and online pharmacies, so that in most cases it is uni-
directional from the seller to the buyer. Furthermore, Barratt, Allen,
and Lenton (2014) presented the case of ‘Australian Bluelight’ drug
forum moderators, who used e-mail to warn other ecstasy users on their
forum about the dangers of inadvertently using PMA (para-methox-
yamphetamine), after the death of 20-year-old Annabel Catt from this
drug.
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Fig. 1. Flow chart of the study selection process used for the systematic review.
Table 2a
Covert strategies related to illegal drug trade.
Strategies No of studies and references
Use of communication channels 8 (Backman, 2013; Barratt, 2011; Barratt et al., 2014; Costello et al., 2017; Gordon et al., 2006; Lavorgna, 2015; Mackey &
Kalyanam, 2017; Mackey et al., 2017)
Anonymity/ghost accounts 29 (Aldridge & Askew, 2017; Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2014, 2016; Backman, 2013; Bancroft, 2017; Bancroft &
Scott Reid, 2017; Barratt, 2011; Barratt, Lenton, Maddox, & Allen, 2016; Broseus et al., 2017; Broséus et al., 2016;
Costello et al., 2017; Dolliver, 2015; Duxbury & Haynie, 2018; Hall et al., 2017; Hardy & Norgaard, 2016; Holt et al., 2015;
Maddox et al., 2016; Moeller et al., 2017; Morselli et al., 2017; Nurmi et al., 2017; Paquet-Clouston et al., 2018; Phelps &
Watt, 2014; Rhumorbarbe et al., 2016; Soska & Christin, 2015; Tzanetakis et al., 2016; van de Ven & Koenraadt, 2017;
Van Hout & Bingham, 2013a, 2013b; Van Hout & Bingham, 2014)
Visibility reduction 3 (Aldridge & Askew, 2017; Barratt, 2011; Costello et al., 2017)
Limited posts in public 2 (Backman, 2013; Barratt, 2011)
Following forum rules and recommendations 3 (Backman, 2013; Barratt, 2011; Phelps & Watt, 2014)
Table 3a
Technology which enables illegal drug trade-related behaviours.
Facilitators No of studies and references
Social networking sites/forums 9 (Backman, 2013; Barratt, 2011; Barratt et al., 2014; Holt et al., 2015; Lavorgna, 2015; Mackey & Kalyanam, 2017; Mackey et al., 2017;
Maddox et al., 2016; Phelps & Watt, 2014)
Digital devices 1 (Gordon et al., 2006)
Digital tools and services 26 (Aldridge & Askew, 2017; Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2014, 2016; Backman, 2013; Bancroft, 2017; Bancroft & Scott Reid, 2017;
Barratt, 2011; Barratt et al., 2016; Broseus et al., 2017; Broséus et al., 2016; Dolliver, 2015; Duxbury & Haynie, 2018; Hall et al., 2017;
Hardy & Norgaard, 2016; Holt, 2017; Lavorgna, 2015; Maddox et al., 2016; Nurmi et al., 2017; Phelps & Watt, 2014; Rhumorbarbe et al.,
2016; Soska & Christin, 2015; Tzanetakis et al., 2016; van de Ven & Koenraadt, 2017; Van Hout & Bingham, 2013a, 2013b; Van Hout &
Bingham, 2014)
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Anonymity/ghost accounts
Twenty-nine studies reported anonymity as a covert strategy related
to procurement/supply of illegal drugs. Cryptomarkets enable buyers
and sellers to transact with a considerable degree of anonymity by
virtue of their location on the hidden web, making it difficult for law
enforcement to trace marketplace activity to participants. These online
markets use (i) the virtually untraceable cryptocurrency Bitcoin, (ii)
The Onion Router (TOR) service and (iii) the encryption of private
messages, files and e-mails using the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) cryp-
tosystem to ensure anonymity (Broséus et al., 2016). Although they are
not completely anonymous, the use of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin
obfuscate links between payments and individuals, particularly when
combined with recent developments like bitcoin tumblers that further
obscure payment trails (Aldridge & Askew, 2017; Bancroft &
Scott Reid, 2017). According to Barratt (2011), avoiding the sharing of
identifying information online, such as the full name and suburb, as
well as the names and contact details of friends and dealers, was a
commonly mentioned strategy. In addition, some of the participants
used one or more pseudonyms online, which were sometimes linked to
their ‘real life’ identities, in order to reduce the risks of disclosing their
identity via online drug discussions. The use of guest/anonymous ac-
counts and browsing protection tools like TOR were also described as
anonymity strategies. In particular, the use of anonymisation services
like TOR in combination with the following cryptomarkets was de-
scribed: Silk Road (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2014; Barratt &
Aldridge, 2016; Hardy & Norgaard, 2016; Maddox, Barratt, Allen, &
Lenton, 2016; Mounteney et al., 2016; Nurmi, Kaskela, Perälä, &
Oksanen, 2017; Phelps & Watt, 2014; Van Hout & Bingham, 2013a,
2013b; Van Hout & Bingham, 2014), Silk Road 2 (Broseus, Morelato,
Tahtouh, & Roux, 2017; Broséus et al., 2016; Dolliver, 2015), Crypto-
market (Duxbury & Haynie, 2018), Alphabay (Paquet-Clouston, Décary-
Hétu, & Morselli, 2018), Evolution (Broseus et al., 2017, 2016;
Rhumorbarbe, Staehli, Broseus, Rossy, & Esseiva, 2016), and Agora
(Broséus et al., 2016; Soska & Christin, 2015; Tzanetakis, Kamphausen,
Werse, & von Laufenberg, 2016). Furthermore, several studies de-
scribed the use of cryptocurrency, like Bitcoin, for transactions
(Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2016; Backman, 2013; Bancroft, 2017;
Bancroft & Scott Reid, 2017; Maddox et al., 2016; Moeller, Munksgaard,
& Demant, 2017; Morselli, Décary-Hétu, Paquet-Clouston, & Aldridge,
2017; Phelps & Watt, 2014; Rhumorbarbe et al., 2016; Soska &
Christin, 2015; Tzanetakis et al., 2016; Van Hout & Bingham, 2013a,
2013b). Another common anonymity strategy that has been described is
the use of encrypted communication, such as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
or Privnote (Aldridge & Askew, 2017; Backman, 2013; Bancroft &
Scott Reid, 2017; Broséus et al., 2016; Soska & Christin, 2015). Addi-
tional anonymity strategies are:
• the destruction of evidence as soon as it's feasible (Aldridge &
Askew, 2017);
• the extension of the users’ technical knowledge and skills in order to
understand how the online illicit drug market works and how to
hide their IP address (Bancroft & Scott Reid, 2017);
• attestability of a persona, as well-known vendors would establish
themselves across different markets (Bancroft & Scott Reid, 2017);
• deniability – i.e. using a false name for deliveries and scrubbing
stored addresses (Bancroft & Scott Reid, 2017);
• masking personal identifiers – i.e. users would avoid using a picture
of themselves (Costello et al., 2017);
• the use of websites such as online pharmacies, business-to-business
websites, social media websites (Hall, Koenraadt, & Antonopoulos,
2017);
• the use of electronic payment systems, providing a modicum of
privacy and anonymity (Holt, Smirnova, Chua, & Copes, 2015);
• using ghost websites (advertise goods and take money, but usually
have no intention of delivering a product of good quality) to market
IPED (image and performance enhancing drugs) market (van de Ven
& Koenraadt, 2017).
Visibility reduction
Three studies reported visibility reduction as a covert strategy re-
lated to procurement/supply of illegal drugs. Barratt (2011) implied
that forum users attempted to reduce the risks of drug discussion in
public online forums by reducing self-incrimination. It was considered
to be less dangerous to describe past experiences of drug use than
dealing and supply, or than referring to present or future drug use.
Others used vague language, code words and the third person to de-
scribe their own experiences, notably by using the acronym SWIM
(Someone Who Isn't Me). An additional forum user mentioned avoiding
risk when posting images of drugs by photographing small amounts of
drugs, and excluding any identifying information from the image.
Likewise, Costello et al. (2017) reported the use of coded language - e.g.
participants called marijuana “pizza” – and the acronym SWIM. Other
visibility reduction strategies according to Aldridge and Askew (2017)
were the following:
• vetting potential customers who may risk drawing mainstream at-
tention to the marketplace;
• providing real, rather than fake, names (to reduce the chances of
shipment interception);
• selecting delivery drop-off locations at a distance from home or
work;
• reducing the visibility of routine activities by rotating drop-off
points;
• avoiding entering post offices where they might be recorded by
CCTV;
• disrupting routines involved in offline activities to make these less
visible;
• making more visible the ‘ordinary’ routine activities in receiving
‘legitimate’ deliveries;
• small quantities of shipping drugs to appear as ordinary business
letters;
• “stealth” packaging (disguise suspect contents to reduce the visibi-
lity of cryptomarket vendor activities).
Limited posts in public
Two studies reported limited posts in public as a covert strategy
related to procurement/supply of illegal drugs. According to
Backman (2013), forum users posted or left a comment on the forums
only if necessary. Barratt (2011) indicated that forum users described
reducing risks by both avoiding drug discussion in public internet
forums, and by participating in such discussion in less risky ways, for
example by discussing drugs infrequently.
Following forum rules and recommendations
Three studies reported following forum rules and recommendations
as a covert strategy related to procurement/supply of illegal drugs. For
Table 4a
Technology which deters illegal drug trade-related behaviours.
Barriers No of studies and references
Social networking sites/forums 2 (Costello et al., 2017; Moeller et al., 2017)
Digital tools and services 4 (Bancroft & Scott Reid, 2017; Moeller et al., 2017; Morselli et al., 2017; Paquet-Clouston et al., 2018)
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example, Backman (2013) included a number of behaviour re-
commendations that members believed would help the community in
avoiding arrests. In addition, user advice concerning security correlated
with technology and Bitcoins had always been a common normative
order in the deep Web drug forums. The findings of Barratt (2011)
showed that some of the forum users, who engaged in some drug dis-
cussion in public online forums attempted to reduce the risks of these
discussions by following the forum drug discussion rules. A popular
video sharing website also featured videos on users’ advice, re-
commendations and perspectives of Silk Road (Phelps & Watt, 2014).
Facilitators of covert strategies
Social networking sites/forums
Nine studies reported social networking sites as an effective facil-
itator of covert strategies related to procurement/supply of illegal
drugs. Drug cryptomarkets function as communities that enable in-
formation sharing for reducing the risks posed by law enforcement to
illegal drug trading (Aldridge & Askew, 2017). For example,
Barratt (2011) implied that most of those who avoided drug discussion
in public forums used private online communication modes, such as
instant messaging, private messaging and non-public-access forums.
Specifically, use of instant messaging protocols is popular amongst the
Russian hacker community (Holt et al., 2015). Bluelight.ru drug forum
used e-mail to warn other ecstasy users about the dangers of inad-
vertently using PMA (Barratt et al., 2014). According to
Lavorgna (2015) Internet networks have facilitated communication,
enhanced efficiency and have also changed the internal organisation of
criminal networks. Mackey and Kalyanam (2017) and
Mackey et al. (2017) showed Twitter as the catalyst for online pro-
motion of illicit substances such as fentanyl. Deep web cryptomarkets,
such as BlackMarket Reloaded and Sheep Marketplace used multiple
communication approaches in order to determine who to trust
(Backman, 2013). In addition, Silk Road forums facilitated an openness
towards discussion of illicit behaviour, covering topics including how to
use Silk Road and the dangers of taking illicit drugs and anonymity,
while the Silk Road Wiki page offered advice and assisted users with
understanding the basic principles of anonymity (Maddox et al., 2016;
Phelps & Watt, 2014).
Digital devices
One study reported digital devices as an effective facilitator of
covert strategies related to procurement/supply of illegal drugs. In
particular, according to Gordon et al. (2006), a high proportion of the
sample had access to a computer with an internet connection and
mobile telephone.
Digital tools and services
Twenty-six studies reported digital tools and services as an effective
facilitator of covert strategies. For example, Barratt (2011) indicated
that few forum users used TOR (browsing protection tool) and guest/
anonymous accounts to prevent authorities from potentially identifying
them through tracking their IP address. Cryptomarkets are online ve-
nues that allow drug vendors to span broad audiences, reshape orga-
nisational structure, and remain relatively anonymous and include the
following platforms: Silk Road (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2014, 2016;
Barratt & Aldridge, 2016; Hardy & Norgaard, 2016; Nurmi et al., 2017;
Van Hout & Bingham, 2013a, 2013b; Van Hout & Bingham, 2014), Silk
Road 2 (Broseus et al., 2017; Dolliver, 2015), Cryptomarket (Duxbury &
Haynie, 2018), Merkat (Bancroft & Scott Reid, 2017), Evolution
(Broseus et al., 2017; Rhumorbarbe et al., 2016) and Agora (Soska &
Christin, 2015; Tzanetakis et al., 2016). The key recommendation by
Deep Web users was the use of encrypted communication, via PGP.
However, this good practice was not always followed (Aldridge &
Askew, 2017; Backman, 2013; Bancroft & Scott Reid, 2017;
Broséus et al., 2016; Soska & Christin, 2015). Various online sites and
payment facilities are simultaneously used to sell illicit drugs
(Hall et al., 2017). For example, the online IPED market (Image and
Performance Enhancing Drugs) earned positive comments from most
online buyers’ experiences (van de Ven & Koenraadt, 2017). In addi-
tion, social engineering is a common tool in many internet-mediating
trafficking activities, such as online illicit drug trade (Lavorgna, 2015).
Electronic payment systems provide a modicum of privacy and anon-
ymity for the participants (Holt et al., 2015). Escrow was a service of-
fered by Silk Road administrators, to protect sellers and buyers from
fraud, offering a level of security in their transactions. The service al-
lowed the bitcoins to be stored by Silk Road until the buyer received
their product (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2016; Backman, 2013;
Bancroft, 2017; Bancroft & Scott Reid, 2017; Maddox et al., 2016;
Phelps & Watt, 2014; Rhumorbarbe et al., 2016; Soska & Christin, 2015;
Tzanetakis et al., 2016; Van Hout & Bingham, 2013a, 2013b).
Barriers to the use of covert strategies
Social networking sites/forums
Two studies reported social networking sites as an effective barrier
to covert strategies related to procurement/supply of illegal drugs.
According to Costello et al. (2017) banter facilitates disclosure of elicit
behaviours in subreddits. In addition, the reputation system creates a
type of fraudulent resource exchange that revolves around unreliable
feedback and fake accounts (Moeller et al., 2017).
Digital tools and services
Four studies reported digital tools and services as an effective bar-
rier of covert strategies related to procurement/supply of illegal drugs.
For example, multiple identities are a challenge for users and vendors.
Having several identities in the same market was thought to be suspi-
cious and the act of scammers, fake vendors and hostile vendors pro-
ducing critical or insulting comments about rival vendors (Bancroft &
Scott Reid, 2017). In addition, some vendors make threats of doxing
(when a person's anonymous online persona is linked with their real-
world identity and address) (Bancroft & Scott Reid, 2017;
Morselli et al., 2017). However, vendors still need to gain knowledge of
how the marketplace and the technologies related to it work in order to
successfully conceal their identity. Moreover, they need to learn how to
successfully conceal and ship the product without attracting attention
from law enforcement agencies, while barriers to sales may be due to
buyers’ tendencies to avoid the risks of transaction failures in online
markets, and to opt for safer and reputable suppliers (Paquet-
Clouston et al., 2018). In addition, cryptomarkets are targeted at the
system level by Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and hacking. Several
sites have publicised statements of being victims of DoS attacks, as well
as hacks and subsequent theft. These attacks consist of gaining access to
databases with information on incriminating and illegal acts, which
may include unencrypted addresses of inexperienced users and bitcoins.
The irreversibility of transactions, and the pseudonymous and anon-
ymisable properties makes bitcoin a perfect target for heists
(Moeller et al., 2017).
Quality assessment
The overview of quality assessment of the 33 qualitative studies is
summarised in Supplementary Table 5. The majority of the studies
stated the aims of the research clearly (n=27), used appropriate qua-
litative methodology (n=30) and recruitment strategy (n=28) and
collected the data in a way that addressed the research issues (n=27).
In addition, they included sufficiently rigorous data analysis (n=23),
stated the findings clearly (n=21), as well as discussing the contribu-
tion of the study and the generalisability of research findings (n=29).
Almost half of the studies used the appropriate research design to ad-
dress the aims of the research. For the majority of the studies, neither
the relationship between researcher and participants has been
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adequately considered (n=30) nor the ethical issues have been taken
into consideration (n=15).
The quality assessment of the cross-sectional study (Duxbury &
Haynie, 2018) is detailed in Supplementary Table 6. In summary, the
study fulfils the majority of the questions. However, there are some
limitations regarding the response rate, the limitations of the study and
the ethical approval or consent of the participants. Nonresponse bias
occurs if the non-responders are substantially different to the rest of the
population in the sample. Thus, any information on non-responders is
crucial. In addition, if the issue of limitations is not explored, this is
cause for concern that the limitations don't stop at the design and that
the researcher(s) has a poor understanding of the study as a whole.
Discussion
Main findings
This review sought to understand how people use the internet when
engaging in covert activities regarding procurement/supply of illicit
drugs. A total of 34 studies (33 qualitative studies and one cross-sec-
tional study) were included in the evidence synthesis. Notably, with the
exception of one study published in 2006, all other studies were pub-
lished from 2011 onwards.
Strategies, enablers and barriers for keeping secrets online
Five covert strategies were identified:
• use of communication channels; anonymity (i.e. anonymous web
browsing);
• anonymity/ghost accounts;
• visibility reduction (i.e. coded language);
• limited posts in public (i.e. avoiding drug discussion in public);
• following forum rules and recommendations.
The same digital tools and services that provide individuals with
easy access to information and enable illegal drug trade-related beha-
viours, were also used to deter these behaviours. In particular, social
networking sites were identified as effective facilitators of covert stra-
tegies. For example, Deep Web forums facilitated an openness for dis-
cussion of illicit behaviours. Digital devices (i.e. computers, cell phones,
and smartphones), as well as digital tools and services were also iden-
tified as effective facilitators of covert strategies. For example, crypto-
markets, cryptocurrency and encrypted communication facilitate illicit
drug trades. Conversely, social networking sites, as well as digital tools
and services were identified as effective barrier of covert strategies.
No secondary outcomes such as effects on physical and mental
health due to covert behaviour were reported in the included studies.
Effect of demographic variables on identified strategies
Due to the sensitive topic of the review, the majority of the included
studies lacked adequate information about demographic character-
istics, such as gender, age and geographical region. However, this was
anticipated, as anonymity enables internet users to hide their identity
with regard to demographic information and personality, and to violate
the law whilst evading detection. It was therefore difficult to explore
the relationship between strategies used and the demographics, and to
draw general conclusions. The studies included data which were mainly
obtained from vendor listings, threads, forum posts, tweets and en-
crypted online interviews. Thus, none of the studies included in-
formation about the effect of age, gender and geographical region on
identified strategies. Therefore, more research is needed on scientifi-
cally assured methods for measuring and analysing targeted outcomes,
in relation to demographic characteristics.
Strengths and limitations
One of the strengths of this literature review is the use of an inter-
disciplinary approach which utilised robust methods of evidence
synthesis developed in the field of health sciences and drew on litera-
ture from computing, criminology and health. The methodological ap-
proach ensured that a comprehensive search strategy was used, and this
facilitated a more evidence-based approach to literature searching in
the field of human–computer interaction where this is not standard
practice. Moreover, inclusion of study designs other than quantitative
studies gave a wide and diverse range of evidence. In the present sys-
tematic review, we also included ‘‘grey’’ literature from western and
non-western countries.
Another important strength is the use of diverse methodological
quality assessment tools, to assess the risk of bias of the included
qualitative, quantitative and mixed-methods studies. Due to the nature
of the evidence sought, it was difficult to pre-define and include them in
the search strategy, which may lead to the exclusion of some studies
from the review. In addition, studies not in English were excluded from
the study, which may bias the findings.
We acknowledge the limitations regarding the number of studies,
the diverse nature of the strategies, the number of targeted outcomes
regarding facilitators and barriers, the methodological quality of studies
included, and the insufficient reporting of evidence. As such, the results
should be interpreted with some caution.
Generalisability of findings
In this paper, we have focussed on the strategies, enablers and
barriers involved in keeping secrets online regarding the procurement
and supply of illicit drugs. The study was carried out as part of a larger
project, Keeping Secrets Online [ref https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/
keeping-secrets-online/], which also examines secret-keeping in two
further contexts: intimate partner violence (Grimani, Gavine, &
Moncur, 2019a) and infidelity (Grimani, Gavine, & Moncur, 2019b).
The Keeping Secrets Online project synthesises new knowledge that is
intended to be useful to those who support people keeping secrets le-
gitimately as part of their job, and will enhance the UK's capacity to
detect and mitigate threats generated via online channels. Findings on
illicit drugs reported herein were distilled and presented within a spe-
cially commissioned book, the ‘Illustrated Guide to Keeping Secrets
Online’ (Moncur et al., 2019), along with findings form the other two
contexts. The Guide summarises research findings in an easy-to-read
format, made up of narratives supported by illustrations and research
insights. It has been used to stimulate fruitful discussion with key sta-
keholders, generating further knowledge on how the strategies, barriers
and enablers uncovered by our research can be applied to people who
need to keep secrets as part of their jobs in countering UK and inter-
national security threats.
Conclusion and implications
The rapid rate of change in how illicit drugs are purchased and
supplied via online channels, digital technologies, devices and services
presents challenges of critical importance for policy agendas
(EMCDDA, 2016). Through this systematic review, we provide insights
into the covert behaviour strategies associated with the supply and
purchase of illicit drugs online. These strategies were enabled through
easy access to information online, and by digital devices, tools and
services. However, they were also subject to barriers, with risks ema-
nating from inaccurate information, loss of privacy, identity theft and
disinhibited communication.
The review highlights the need for more well-designed studies that
address strategies for online secret-keeping, and more scientifically
assured methods for measuring and analysing targeted outcomes in
relation to demographic characteristics. There was also a gap in the
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research regarding the effects on physical and mental health outcomes
due to online covert behaviours and activities.
The insights provided in this review may support policymakers in
considering how best to respond to the emergent challenges on online
purchase and supply of illicit drugs, and to exploit the opportunities
that online channels offer for reducing drug problems. Further, through
our approach to generalisation of findings, the synthesised knowledge is
already helping law enforcement and security agencies to develop the
UK's capacity to support people who keep secrets as part of their jobs,
and who work to detect and mitigate threats generated via online
channels.
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